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Reframing Narratives of State Building in Africa: Lessons from South Sudan. 
Medhane Tadesse 
Overview 
The Sudan peace process and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement/CPA/ of 2005 did 
not realize viable state and sustainable peace in south Sudan.  South Sudan is a deeply 
divided state under a divided and politically immature ruling party and instead of 
reducing conflict, independence served to intensify the internal divisions as the SPLM 
elite competed over control of the state. Four years after becoming an independent 
state, South Sudan is experiencing a multifaceted crisis that has its epicentre in the 
SPLM led government, but finds reflection in all spheres of governance and the SPLA.  
From its origins in the Derg dominated Ethiopia to its rise to power the SPLM/A 
pursued political objectives at odds with the sentiment of South Sudanese which has 
defined, for better or worse, the trajectory of peace and state building. The analysis in 
this research argues that the political conditions for durable state and peace building 
have not existed and do not appear imminent. It is not happenstance that peace and 
state building have become problematic and the country had entered another phase of a 
violent conflict. Torn between conflicting ideologies and weak institutional base the 
SPLM/A chose to ignore, often suppress, the dominant popular narratives of statehood 
in South Sudan and ended up only holding power without an overarching peace and 
state building agenda. The results of this were all too apparent in the recent eruption of 
a violent conflict. This study is about exploring these relationships and their mutually 
reinforcing attributes in the context of the ever changing security and political 
landscape in the newly declared African country. The anticipated outcome is a 
researched, deep and an advanced analysis of the challenges of peace and state building 
in South Sudan.    
Approach and methodology 
This research in the first instance is evidently based on years of engagement with South 
Sudan. However, accessing written sources and documents from recent years about the 
views of South Sudanese on state and peace building will form an integral part of the 
methodology. As a result, while referring to the limited relevant literature, this study 
will be largely based on discussions and conversations with a range of people, mostly 
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political leaders and activists carried out in recent years. The research will make use of 
the wealth of data compiled from South Sudanese, at all levels in the ten states of South 
Sudan, which served as inputs for the development of a National Security Strategy for 
the Republic of South Sudan. The relevant documents point to the competing narratives 
and trajectories of peace and state building in the youngest African state. 
The outbreak of fighting in Juba and beyond in December 2013 makes the preparation 
of this paper considerably more difficult because a follow-on field research is not 
probable though this could be compensated by the author’s eye witness account  weeks 
before the latest conflict began and a couple of visits to Juba afterwards.  As a result this 
research will be submitted in two parts:  the first and major portion will be based on the 
historical background that had defined trajectories of state and peace building, 
particularly the origin and political development of the SPLM/A, and the second and 
shorter submission will attempt to bring together some of the major themes of the post-
independence political and governance issues with the background research and 
construct an over-reaching analysis and conclusions.  The challenge of a paper of this 
nature is to appreciate the significance of the flurry of events, but not be overwhelmed 
by them and keep the analysis geared to the big picture and processes.   
Theoretical starting points. 
In this section the narratives of statehood in south Sudan will be analysed through the 
prism of Sudan as one of the conquest states in Africa, the origin and political 
development of the SPLM/A,and the broader context of liberation movements in Africa. 
Sudan as one of the conquest states in Africa 
The war of liberation in South Sudan, the Anyanya movement of the 1960s  and the 
emergence of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) is largely influenced 
by the peculiar history of the Sudan as one of the Conquest States (besides Ethiopia) in 
Africa. The process of state formation is compounded by expansion, repression, 
marginalization and even racism. Ethiopia and Sudan emerged as a conquest states in 
the 19th century, their boundaries and ethnic makeup marked by where their 
respective armies had reached at the time the scramble for Africa. There are structural 
reasons for why the liberation movements in Sudan came to be driven by a particular 
narrative including the militarization of governance prominent among which is the 
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relationship between centre and periphery and the contested legitimacy of states. To 
this effect the civil wars in Sudan have all been primarily between historic centre and 
marginalized peripheries and statehood in has been associated with the exploitation of 
peripheries by the centre. Sometimes that exploitation has been extremely rapacious 
and violent glued with racist and religious undertones. A point to highlight is that 
centre-periphery relations have been determined by the ethnic and religious character 
of the group that controls the state. No wonder the survival of the state was ensured 
through the imposition of imperial power over peoples to the South and West of its 
Centre in Khartoum which resulted in a deeply unequal political structure in which 
power was derived from the Muslim-Arab riverine elite. 
Conversely, the specific contours of state formation also ensured the peculiar 
contradiction of the Sudanese state which came to be violently resisted and challenged 
by armed ethnic organizations. The Sudan expanded as an extension of the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium on the regions numerous ethnic groups, many of which had 
previously had little if any association with the imperial regime. This defined the 
identity of the state as perceived by and eventually challenged by ethno-nationalist 
forces. It easily became the basis for the differing experiences and contrasting 
narratives of the state and a harbinger to violent wars of liberation.  
Probably an extension of this is the prevalence of ‘divide and rule’ militarized strategies 
for control in the Horn’s frontier regions which has implications for interstate relations 
and repercussions for domestic state and peace building agendas. Hence, a long 
detected characteristic of state and peace building processes in the Horn of Africa is the 
doctrine of mutual proxy destabilization, or the practice of governmental or other forces 
supporting opposition groups in neighbouring states. 1Peace and state building in south 
Sudan, particularly in the post-independence era, cannot be fully documented without 
considering the nature of ‘mutual interventions’. And the Sudan has been the nadir of 
this strategy in Africa, much beyond the adjacent areas. Sudanese strategy of proxy 
destabilization in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, the Central Africa Republic/CAR/ and 
as far as Libya is a good case in point. 
The SPLM/A within the Broader Context of Liberation Movements in Africa 
                                                          
1 Cliffe, 1999. 
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The second most important starting point which is linked with the above is the SPLM as 
an African Liberation Movement. Although not engaged in a struggle against 
colonialism, the twenty-two year long war of the SPLM/A resembles the liberation 
movements that Africa gave birth to a generation earlier than the post-independence 
ones. But unlike the earlier ones, which had a strong political component, it quickly 
mutated into a largely military organization. The SPLM/A is different construct, 
definitely in eastern Africa. While its focus on armed struggle distances itself from other 
liberation movements like the African National Congress its failure to link its struggle 
with a strong political agenda distances it from other liberation movements in Uganda, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. The SPLM/A is in its own category as a liberation movement in 
between those in Southern (and many parts of) Africa and the Horn of Africa.2 This had 
impacted on its weak organizational and political character and made it less prepared to 
mobilize the Southern population for a political project.  
Again, the SPLM/A remains distinct because the other movements in the Horn won 
decisive military victories, while the SPLM/A came to power through international 
pressure and a negotiated settlement which continued to complicate peace and state 
building agenda in South Sudan after 2005. Not to mention the fact that this provided a 
lee way for the north to implement its destabilization strategy. The political weakness 
and organizational fitness of the SPLM/A can be another starting point to analyze the 
trajectory of state and peace building in south Sudan. This level of analysis might take as 
to a different set of theoretical assumptions about what is referred to as ‘bandit 
rationality’. I am tempted to argue that the origin and development of the SPLM might 
be closer to the ‘roving bandits’ and ‘stationery bandits’ analysis that to other liberation 
movements in power.3 One would argue that the warlords of the SPLM/A have 
transitioned to stationery bandits by stealing all the resources of the emerging state. 
Commensurate to historical experiences the warlords had to claim legitimacy through 
the CPA and their thefts were distinguished from those of roving bandits only because 
                                                          
2The SPLM/A is in a different category in the Horn of African region. Unlike the TPLF and the EPLF, but in 
line with the practice in Uganda, the rebels of Southern Sudan drew the distinction between the SPLM and 
the SPLA  
3 The expression was forged by Mancur Olson in his analysis of the transition from anarchy to 
dictatorship. 
Embezzled oil revenues here replace the taxes leveled by the stationary bandits in Olson’s analysis. See 
Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” The American Political Science Review 87, 
no. 3, September 1993, p. 567. 
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they took the form of continuing taxation rather than occasional plunder.4 The relative 
comfort of this scenario would have been that the possible monopolization of theft and 
the protection of the tax-generating subjects would thereby eliminate anarchy and 
provide a fertile ground for peace and state building. The tragedy of the SPLM/A is 
however that it failed to achieve the monopolization of theft and avert anarchy.  
The preoccupation of the new masters of south Sudan with greed and corruption must 
seem to outsiders like an accidental obsession. For as long as the SPLM/A has existed in 
the picture war making and profiteering were the norm and not the exception. Part of 
the reason may be that the group had to deal with how southern society is organized 
and cannot resist the temptation to make the most of it. But in all fairness there is more 
to it than that. The role of leadership coupled with external influence had a heavy toll on 
the nature of the organization as well. Leadership theory might give us a clue to what it 
meant to be a liberation movement in Sudan within the context of the Horn of African 
region. To the extent that a societal analysis is required the traditional and factional 
character of southern Sudanese society must be considered as well. Equally informative 
would be the attempt to impose liberal formulas of state and peace building into a 
traditional and deeply illiberal society and social base. 
Once the theoretical assumptions and framework of analysis listed above and the origin 
and development of the SPLM/A  are understood, one can begin to see the problems and 
complexities involved in state and peace building in south Sudan. Compounding this is 
the brief political history of south Sudan as an entity and the specific origins of the 
SPLM/A. 
A short history of south Sudan 
The history of south Sudan as a distinct geographic and political entity is a recent 
phenomenon. It was in the early 19th century that the Turko-Egyptian Administration 
began to mould the region known as “Bilad al Soda’s”- the country of the blacks- into a 
modern state. The singular focus of foreign invaders to the present day south Sudan has 
been plunder of human (slavery) and natural resources. The Turks have set the 
standard that has been followed to some degree by the British and successive 
governments in Sudan which defined centre-periphery relations and the nature of 
                                                          
4 Ibid.P. 568. 
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liberation wars all over the country. A major aspect of analysis in the political economy 
of conflict is therefore the fact that Statehood throughout northeast Africa has been 
associated with the exploitation of peripheries by the centre. As hinted above often that 
exploitation has been, and remains to be, extremely rapacious and violent. However it 
was in the 20th century that the British began to treat the north and the south as two 
different entities. As a result the origins of separate political consciousness began to 
develop in the early 1920s. A contributing factor was the so-called southern policy of 
the British aimed at getting rid of Islamic-Arabic influence in the south.5  
The political activism of the 1930s coupled with regional events such as the 1952 
Egyptian Revolution led by Gemal Abdel Naser heightened political consciousness all 
over Sudan which culminated in the Torit uprising of August 18 1955 by southern 
soldiers. This is the precursor to the first phase of war of liberation in south Sudan, the 
Ananya I movement with the sole objective of liberating south Sudan from the yoke of 
Arab domination.  The first civil war led to the Addis Ababa Agreement of February 27 
1972 and a period of self-rule in south Sudan. It was also during this period that a 
common ground between the south and other marginalized peoples of Sudan began to 
take shape. This is critical due to the fact the struggle of the SPLM/A has been part and 
parcel of all the marginalized peoples in the Sudan with a significant impact on the 
framing of narratives of statehood. 
The decade of self-rule (1973-1983) could be considered as the most important 
experience of the southern political elite in self-government and notions of liberal 
democracy. The period had also revealed the political divisions within the south with 
ethnic and regional undertones. Many shocked due to the call by some for the practical 
division of the South. Although there has always been a façade of unity, ethnic and 
sectorial tendencies overwhelmed the so-called the Kokora movement of the late 1970s, 
a harbinger of the quest by Equatorians for self-determination and strong federal 
system. According to the Equatorian political elite greater regionalization would remove 
what they referred to as ‘Nilotic Influence’ from Equatorian politics. Such a view is very 
much present in the emerging political discourse in south Sudan.6 At the end of self-rule 
                                                          
5 Arp Madut-Arop.The Genesis of Political Consciousness in South Sudan.2012. 
6 A view led by the Equatorians such as the Equatoria Intellectuals Central Committee is prevalent to this 




and shortly before the launch of the second liberation led by the SPLM/A the division of 
the south had become the most hotly contested issue and tensions were high in the 
capital Juba. 
Interestingly it is in reaction to political and military pressures by external forces, as 
during the Turko-Egyptian period and the British before them, that many southerners 
met their own specific narratives that have translated to political positions on how to 
govern south Sudan. The largest communities of southern Sudan, such as the Dinka’s 
and the Nuer had developed their own narratives in the war of resistance against the 
encroachment of the British from northern Sudan and later during the second civil war. 
Many in Equatoria alleged they have seen the first tests and instincts’ of Dinka 
hegemony during self-rule and began to entertain ‘decentralization’ to fend of 
themselves from the perceived domination of the Nilotic people, particularly the Dinka.7 
Some reports indicate that many from Equatoria initially refused to join the SPLM/A 
which is viewed to this day as a Dinka-dominated organisation. 8This served as a strong 
narrative to many of the non-Dinka ethnic groups particularly the Equatorians and 
continued to shape contradictory political developments and affect the nature of conflict 
in independent south Sudan. The call by Riek Machar for a federal system of 
government in the recent negotiations-which led to the Compromise Peace Agreement 
of August 2015- is not only a reminder of the perceived notion of Dinka domination 
prevalent among the Nuer but it is also intended to be a rallying point to mobilise the 
Equatorians and other Bantu tribes in south Sudan to his cause. It is fair to say that the 
issue of federalism is the single most important sticking point in the search for peace 
and the reconstruction of state in south Sudan. It is not a surprise that the Dinka’s prefer 
a unitary state, with a semblance of administrative decentralisation.9 The identity and 
course of a south Sudan state is still a bone of contention. 
Be this as it may it is the internal contradictions and contradictory positions of the 
SPLM/A that takes the lion’s share in the problems of peace and state building after 
independence. One of the main reasons many political commentators were surprised by 
                                                          
7 Even Joseph Lagu,a popular leader of the Ananya Movement and late one of the Chief Executives of 
South Sudan during self rule is believed to have called for the various tribes in south Sudan to unite 
against Dinka domination. Such a concern is very much alive in post-independence south Sudan,the more 





the failure of the south Sudanese political elite is the failure to appreciate the gap 
between appearance and content in the SPLM/A. Indeed, this is at the centre of the 
current crisis. Evidently, the historical experience of the SPLM during the Southern civil 
war will be drawn upon to explain why it never developed a viable political party, and 
then turn to the present period to make clear the challenges faced in the much sought 
state building process problematic. 
The SPLM/A: Origin and Development 
Any attempt to understand the political direction of the SPLM/A must start in 1983 with 
the twist of coincidence around John Garang and Megistu’s Ethiopia. And most of the 
political ailments of the SPLM/A derive from this as10 Garang was quick to appreciate 
that the military regime in Ethiopia would lend him support if he formulates a 
programme that suits the interests of the Derg and its leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam. 
The Derg was fighting against Eritrean separatists and abhorred the idea of separatist 
movements.11 Garang’s SPLM/A in a clear departure from the popular mood among the 
southern community and the separatist agenda that guided the Anyanya during the 
course of South Sudan’s first civil war endorsed a programme based on a united Sudan. 
And the united Sudan should be a Socialist one and the SPLM/A had to take all as one 
package. In the words of one of south Sudanese political leaders ‘it appears the SPLM 
Manifesto of 1983 was not intended for the people of south Sudan’.12Despite the fact 
that the southern sentiment favoured a war based on a clear commitment of separation 
from the north, the SPLM/A adopted unity stance largely to please external allies.13  
Arguably, the political objective of liberation from northern Arab/Muslim domination 
and the sensibilities of the largely religious and traditional minded southerners had 
been dampened by Garang’s desire to acquire badly needed weapons14 through which 
he was able to defeat his Anyanya II opponents who supported southern separation. 
The political developments of the SPLM/A should then be assessed and this will 
demonstrate the movement’s ideological weakness and failure to establish a party with 
roots in the southern community. The point to emphasize here is that the SPLM/A as an 
                                                          
10 P.Adwok;p.30 
11 Lesch.A. The Sudan-Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
12 Discussions with P.Adwok. 
13 Discussions with SPLM/A representatives in Addis. 
14 Rolandsen, Oystein. Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan During the 1990’s. 




organisation is characterized by ideological contradiction and confusion. Torn between 
marxism and nationalism, pan-Arabism and African socialism, Islam and the quest for a 
secular state, united New Sudan and separation, and between south Sudan and the 
marginalized peoples of Sudan the SPLM/A failed to prepare for the political 
complexities of state building. 
Between Self-determination and National Unity; Independent South Sudan 
and ‘New Sudan’.     
It might look a paradox but it is true that though the SPLM/A proclaimed a national 
vision and agenda in the form of a commitment to New Sudan, it ended up only holding 
power in the region from which it began its armed struggle, dipping a life-long 
commitment and agenda in a sudden and spontaneous way. Thus, while all of the 
liberation movements began from narrow ethnic bases, they were able-to a greater or 
lesser degree-to move beyond them to embrace sufficiently wide sections of the 
population to gain state power and proclaim a legitimising ideology to rule their 
respective countries. The same is true with the way and speed with which it dropped 
Marxism and joined the US camp. So a major difference to take into account is that while 
all of the other liberation movements in the Horn of African region were guided by 
Marxism-Leninism through much of their period of armed struggle, the SPLM/A only 
accepted Marxism-Leninism as a means to gain the support of the Ethiopian Derg. 
Between Marxism and Nationalism 
To the extent that the SPLM/A adopted Marxism and the creation of a socialist country 
as a mere slogan there has never been internal debate and social mobilisation and 
education around it. No wonder the group was caught between militarism and social 
revolution and the drawbacks of militarism without discipline and obedience was there 
to haunt civil-military relations. With the overthrow of Mengistu in 1991, which 
corresponded with the end of the Cold War, the SPLM/A increasingly drew closer to the 
US, making clear a pattern of dependence on foreign benefactors. If there was a plan to 
command a narrative and political project it has been taken over by events. The SPLM/A 
rapidly shifted gears, finding allies among Christian groups, and most significantly with 
those linked to the Republican Party in the US-a long-shot, one would assume, from one 
superficial ideology to another-not rooted in the Southern society. A sort of non-natural 
transition but the fundamental issue is that unlike other similar organisations ideology 
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and ideological divisions have never figured significantly in the SPLM/A’s political 
development. Whatever the cosmetic changes this already had its toll on the confusing 
narratives and ideologies.15  
Between Islam and the Quest for a Secular State 
The incapability of the SPLM/A to articulate a dominant narrative and develop a 
coherent political project aside it would be wrong to dismiss either the legitimacy of the 
southern struggle, or the commitment of the southerners to the struggle. Indeed the 
dominant narrative among the southern population has been the war for freedom from 
Arab supremacy and Islamic domination by northerners, albeit not tediously captured 
by the SPLM. After all it was the unilateral imposition of the Islamic Sharia laws 
throughout the country by President Nimeri in 1983 that triggered the second 
liberation movement by the SPLM/A.  In a way it has been the mistake of successive 
governments in Khartoum to conclude that the African south did not have strong ideals 
such as Islam and Arabism to underpin and sustain their opposition to northern 
hegemony. In other words the war of liberation could be characterized as against the 
Muslim/Arab domination but in favour of nothing else i.e. the end set is less clear than 
the cause of the war. And while Garang’s rhetorical support at various times for state 
socialism and a new Sudan never had much resonance among Southern Sudanese, 
opposition to the forceful input of Arabism and Islam did. 
The SPLM/A has always envisioned a secular Sudan.  No doubt, for many southerners 
the struggle was clear and simple: liberate their territory from Arab-Muslim supremacy. 
These two conflicting visions of Sudan do not easily give way to compromise and indeed 
they shouldn’t, but the CPA had to create a Sharia enclave in the north even if 
southerners had to opt for unity in the referendum. 
 
The SPLM in the context of marginalized peoples in Sudan 
Efforts by the SPLM/A under John Garang to link the different organisations of the 
marginalized peoples in Sudan to capture the state at the centre did not prove 
successful. Salva’s project takes place against the background of the failure of the 
                                                          
15 By ideology it is meant ‘an ethical set of ideas, principles, doctrines, myths or symbols. That explain 
how society should work, and offer some political and cultural blue print for a certain social order{and} 




Garang and Abyei boys, together with their allies in the SPLM-N and Darfur, to realize 
the goals of New Sudan and overthrow the Khartoum regime. From its name to its 
membership and association the SPLM/A has always been at the center of the struggle 
by the marginalized populations of the Sudan in all geographical locations, for liberation 
and self-determination. This has shaped its identity and the meaning of its armed 
struggle for many years until it was dropped unceremoniously. Decade’s old association 
with other Sudanese marginalized rebel groups-closely or remotely- is another axis of 
the confusing narratives and puzzling political projects.16  
Authoritarian roots and regional Influences 
The SPLM/A is characterized by lack of institutionalism. The few modicum of 
institutions created were decidedly made powerless. The SPLM/A’s origins in Ethiopia 
had repercussions beyond ideology. John Garang had to embrace a regime which was 
rooted in military power, while the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia was a mere instrument of 
that power and designed to give his regime legitimacy in the Eastern Bloc to whom he 
was dependent. Following that model and his own sensibilities Garang constructed 
ruthless institutions of internal security under the tutelage of the Eastern Bloc which 
were responsible for killing and eliminating opponents and rival groups. Like Nimeiri 
and Mengistu the SPLM party was designed to preclude independent political activity, 
gain legitimacy, and only assumed a genuine role late in the day.  Real power, however, 
continued to rest with the military and security organs solely commanded by the 
Chairman. The SPLM was a late out-growth of the SPLA, which was dominated by the 
Bor Dinka of John Garang, has always assumed a militarist approach to resolving 
political problems, and more often than not was viewed as occupier, rather than 
liberator, by the people of South Sudan. It was only held together by the iron hand of 
John Garang who fought against party institutionalization that would ensure democratic 
accountability.  With his death and independence, the party lost both its sense of 
direction and firm leadership, and only maintained unity through patronage and looting 
of state resources. 
                                                          
16 A reminder that the identity of the SPLM/A has not be settled to this day. Concluding that South Sudan 
could never be free of insecurity as long as the NCP ruled Sudan, the new government in Juba not only 
supported rebels in the north, but looked to the closure of the oil pipeline as a means to stimulate internal 
struggles in the north.  Despite the assurances of SPLM-N leader, Malik Agar, and Secretary-General, Yasir 
Arman, that Bashir could be overthrown through insurgencies in Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba 
Mountains and a parallel civilian uprising in Khartoum, these plans have not come to fruition.   
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After initially following a conciliatory approach to government, Salva Kiir have become 
intent on assuming a similar hegemonic position as that held by his predecessor, Dr. 
John Garang, as evident in his attempt to neutralize the SPLM, expand his own powers, 
and post 15 December jailing his leading opponents. The slight difference is that Salva 
hails from Warrap and Northern Bahr Ghezal. The regional character and sociology, if 
not the ethnography, of political power might have but the authoritarian approach has 
remained intact. The authoritarian approach of both Garang and Salva has deep roots in 
the SPLM.  The SPLM/A was influenced during its formative period by the governments 
of Jafar Nimeiri and Mengistu Haile Mariam.17 Most influential on the SPLM, however, 
has been the NCP to which a number of members of the present government belonged 
and even more participated in the NCP-dominated Government of national Unity/GNU/ 
and the experience of the long peace negotiations.  
The contagion effect of northern Sudanese intelligence agencies and the NCP which is 
dominated by the military-security nexus on the SPLM leadership and its organisational 
culture is a source of concern. Indeed, the current SPLM leadership seems to have 
acquired many of its approaches to governance from the NCP. 18Against that 
background no one should be surprised that Salva is trying to construct an authoritarian 
in south Sudan with himself at the pinnacle but similar to the regime in Khartoum from 
which southerners paid enormously to disaffiliate.  The impact of this resemblance and 
association on the narratives of statehood in south Sudan would be quite enormous and 
needs further interrogation. 
Meso-level Narratives: Equatorians, the Dinka and the Nuer. 
The narrative that the Dinka’s want to replace northern Arab domination by their own 
in an independent south is as old as the genesis and early development of political 
consciousness in south Sudan. And the mythology that the Nuer aspire to snatch 
political influence and power from the Dinka is also powerful enough to determine the 
alliance in the new state. This is based on the legend that the Nuer prophet,Ngundeng,is 
                                                          
17 But probably most significantly by the National Congress Party/NCP/, the ruling party in north Sudan.  
Nimeiri’s power was based on the military and security organs, while the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was 
designed to co-opt all political party activity and all politicians were required to join it.   
18 The influence ranges from the actual structure of the government, the role of the ruling party in the 
government, the pretense of parliamentary democracy under what is effectively a one-party state, the 
absorption of nominally opposition parties into the governing party, the role of presidential advisors, and 
the growing significance of the intelligence and security organs.  Consistent with all of these parties was 
the opposition to other poles of power, including traditional authorities.    
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said to have prophesized that a leader of south Sudan would come from the descendants 
of Teny-Dhurgon,to which Riak Machar belongs. The authenticity of the legend aside it 
is difficult to underestimate its political impact in present day south Sudan. The 
perceptions and misperceptions associated with it continue to influence political and 
military actions of the leaders in the GoS.  
The preoccupation of both Nuer and Dinka political elite with the concerns surrounding 
the prophesy must seem to outsiders like an obsession. Recent attempts at eliminating 
Riak Machar at any cost by the army allied to President Salva Kiir - and led by Paul 
Malong and the powerful body of the Jiyeng Council (Dinka Elders) -  cannot not be 
totally delinked from the broader mythology. 19 Although other considerations of actual-
potential balance of power are still critical to the violent contest the propensity to deal a 
final blow to an age old narrative is a strong component. Equally important is the 
collaboration of many Nuer, including Riak Machar, with Khartoum after the Nasir 
debacle of 1991 against the mainstream SPLM/A  during the liberation war which 
serves as a powerful counter-narrative to undermine the chances of Nuer politician’s 
rise to the top position of power in post-2005 south Sudan. Coupled with the Bor 
Massacre of the Dinka’s in the hands of militias allied with Riek Machar in September 
1991 the Danka’s continued to use this narrative as a major disqualifying factor for Riak 
to occupy the top position and a rallying cry among die hard Danka’s to control and 
monopolize power in the new state. Furthermore the Dinka’s claim to have played the 
largest role in the liberation struggle particularly the one led by the SPLM/A, hence a 
sense of entitlement and corresponding responsibility to sustain the new political 
dispensation, a claim bitterly contested by rival elites. Achieving a monopoly on the 
liberation narrative is key to the on-going conflict and power struggle in the country.   
A recent narrative that complicates the search for peace and confidence building among 
the various communities in south Sudan is the massacre of the Nuer in Juba in 
December 2013 which heralded the recent conflict. Addressing this head on will go a 
long way in the much needed reconciliation and peace building endeavours. Salva’s 
claim of a Riek led coup does not seem to be credible, and even less that it was the cause 
of the ensuing conflict.  Instead, the immediate stimulus to the revolt was the targeting 
                                                          
19 Paul Malong is former governor of Northern Bahr Ghazal and current Chief of Staff of the army is 
considered as a power behind the throne. 
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of Nuers in the streets of Juba by the Presidential Guards which in turn may have been 
the result of a plan to kill Riek that went astray.  The high-profile atrocities perpetuated 
by both sides have contributed to cement the competing narratives and remain a 
challenge to create an inclusive society and a workable formula for peace and state 
building.20 
To the extent that the prophesy of the Nuer prophet Mundeng that Nuer rule will 
eventually become a reality is relished and loathed by many it will continue to 
determine the nature of political power and the trajectory of conflicts. As a result there 
those who argue that the Nuer tribe collectively holds false assumptions prominent 
among which relates to their perceived superiority as fighters, and given the natural or 
creative chaos in south Sudan, they will be the ultimate victors and that the abysmal 
failure of the Dinka’s in government to date makes them the only better alternative and 
uniquely qualified to rule South Sudan. And all of these notions are tied together under 
the prophesy of the Nuer prophet.21 Equally critical is the oil factor which serves to 
reinforce the Nuer claim to have a visible power in south Sudan and definitely in the oil 
producing regions of Upper Nile and Unity states.  
The fact that many Nuer had joined the SSDF and fought alongside Khartoum in the 
‘north-south’ conflict is conditioned on both geography and oil. The epithets given to 
many Nuers by others, particularly the Dinka for their role in the war on the side of 
Khartoum is symptomatic of the level of difficulty faced by Nuer politicians in the on-
going power struggle. It is often difficult to distinguish the Nuer agenda from the oil and 
the delicate balancing act they had to make during the liberation struggle. The failures 
of the present regime and subsequent turmoil do not mean that Dinka domination has 
ended, particularly in view of the international support for the regime. Whatever the 
outcome of the war and the diplomatic efforts at peace-making the political future of the 
Nuers is likely to be grim.  The growing faith among Nuers in the supposed predictions 
of Mundeng is bound to lead to disillusion as Salva and the international community 
                                                          
20 In any case, the responsibility for those killings must be determined and the perpetuators – even if they 
include Salva Kiir as many believe – must be identified and turned over to the courts.  Unless that is done, 
and be seen to be done fairly and openly, the Juba targeted killings of the Nuers will become as deeply a 
felt grievance among the Nuer as that of the Bor who still harken back as the attack by Riek and his 
followers on their community 23 years ago. 
21 A belief of many Nuers – and a belief that is being milked by Riek Macher – that the great Nuer prophet 
Mundeng’s predictions of Nuer rule is in the process of being realized.   
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work to ensure the maintenance of a regime which will not address the concerns of the 
tribe. 
Even if the approaches to conflict resolution pursued by the East African diplomats 
produces a measure of elite accommodation, it is unlikely to last long and will in any 
case not satisfy the Nuer who would consider anything less than the Nuer replacing the 
dominant position of the Dinka in government as both a defeat and a tribal humiliation.  
The line most often heard by the Nuer is ‘if we lose the war we will be slaves of the 
Dinka.’  Riek may be willing to compromise, but behind him are hard men who did not 
go to war just to see a shifting of chairs among the elite.   
 Sudan and South Sudan: A History of Political Agreements 
This section will discuss the nature of the IGAD peace process from the Declaration of 
Principles/DOP/ to the Machakos protocol, from the CPA to the Juba Peace Agreement 
and their cumulative import in the competing narratives and antagonistic trajectories of 
state and peace building. 
Framing Peace and Statehood: The DOP 
Sudan had witnessed several peace agreements in its short of history of independent 
statehood to the extent that the country has literally become an amalgamation of peace 
accords, both active and doormat. It is not the concern of this study to focus on the 
peace processes in Sudan but by way of background it is suffice to highlight that the 
basis for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement/CPA/ in 2005 and the eventual 
independence of South Sudan is the Declaration of Principles/DOP/  of July 1994.22 The 
Intergovernmental Authority for development/IGAD/ began to involve in the Sudan 
peace process in the early 1990s. However negotiations made headway only after the 
developing military pressure by IGAD member countries particularly Ethiopia, Eritrea 
and Uganda against Khartoum. Both the political and military preconditions for peace in 
the Sudan seem to have been provided by IGAD member states. This is important to 
understand the nature of southern Sudanese independence and the narratives 
associated with state and peace building. The regional aspects are critical to whatever 
successes achieved and challenges faced by the new African state.  
                                                          
22 Declaration of Principles.Nairobi,20th July,1994. 
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Beyond preparing the ground for the ‘north-south’ peace process the involvement of 
IGAD is believed to have shaped the narratives of statehood in south Sudan as stipulated 
in the DOP and follow-on security and foreign policy of the regional organisation 
particularly Ethiopia. Not only did Ethiopia’s military involvement and the resultant 
balance of power sustain the CPA but its disappointment on the SPLM/A will complicate 
the nature of external support to the peace and state building process. Quite brilliantly 
the DOP consecrates the right to self-determination, the separation of state and religion 
and fair sharing of wealth, mainly oil that was meant to form new foundation of state 
and peace building. The political aspirations of the south were expected to be addressed 
within this broader framework and it was evidently clear that peace in Sudan and state 
building in south Sudan meant that these contentious issues had to be tackled 
realistically.23 
The declaration stipulates that maintaining unity of the Sudan must be given priority by 
all parties provided that the principles are established in the political, legal, economic 
and social framework of the country. It is clear that neighbouring countries assumed the 
political aspirations of southern Sudanese and their own security interests will be best 
served by a united, democratic and secular Sudan. This was not going to happen which 
contributed to incompatible narratives at the national and regional levels. The 
argument expanded here is that the region’s preferred narrative of statehood was much 
closer to what the SPLM/A officially adopted during John Garang which was tacitly 
abandoned and not conversant with the broader political aspirations of southern 
Sudanese. This raises a question about the CPA: Leap Forward or Retreat?  Another 
problem facing the SPLM in the wake of Garang’s death is therefore the need to redefine 
its role in international and regional affairs, as both the region and the US were caught 
off-guard by his sudden death. 
Eventually, the SPLM/A will become heavily dependent on the US for almost all aspects 
of security and the conduct of foreign policy particularly as it relates to Khartoum. This 
heavy dependence will have its own toll on the trajectories of peace and state building. 
Heavy dependence on the US and being party to the CPA was taken as the fundamental 
basis of international legitimacy and the sole determinant of being a state actor in 
                                                          




international relations. As well as its internal problems, it is no secret that the SPLM/A 
suffers from multi-faceted dependency i.e. economic, political and diplomatic. 
Meanwhile the CPA itself was largely the result of international pressure which in itself 
is problematic. 
Compounding this was the fact that the peace process remained elitist and exclusionary 
and failed to address the underlying causes of the war. The level of exclusion is not 
limited to political and armed groups but also the sphere of competing narratives.  
SPLM/A and SSDF: Rival Groups or Competing Narratives? 
The exclusion of the GoS-supported SSDF, which was an armed southern force similar in 
size to the SPLA, in particular posed a major threat to the viability of the peace process 
and state building in south Sudan largely because it’s membership is largely made up of 
Nuers,it controlled a significant amount of territory in the south with a measurable 
monopoly of violence, including much of the oil fields, which brings a tribal dimension 
to its conflict with the largely Dinka dominated SPLM/A. Khartoum continued to exploit 
the competing narratives and ethnic divisions in south Sudan. Indeed, at the core of the 
post-1991 security problems in south Sudan has been NCP’s support of Other Organised 
Forces/OAGs/ in the south. Although Salva kiir managed to bring most of the SSDF 
membership into the SPLA and thus avert war through the Juba Declaration of January 
8, 2015 this was done at a huge cost to state building. Indeed, state building process in 
south Sudan particularly the transformation of security institutions have become the 
victims of the Juba peace agreement. In the meantime, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army was radically transformed after the 2006 Juba Declaration. Hence it is fair to raise 
the question about the agreement.  
The Juba Peace Agreement: Asset or Liability? 
The source of the problems of the south Sudan army as an arm of a new state have 
already been compromised by the nature of the SPLA but became aggravated when the 
SSDF became integrated which resulted in a ballooned, less professional and 
extortionist institution. But the deal had a short-term political impact: the weakening of 
Nuer insurgency and the dampening of leadership struggle infavor of Salva within the 
SPLM/A. This brings us to another critical aspect of peace and state building in south 
Sudan, i.e. the issue of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration/DDR/. 
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Failed Reconciliation or Failed Disarmament? 
There is a sort of natural connection between Demobilization, Disarmament and 
Reintegration/DDR/ and peace and state building in countries emerging from conflict in 
Africa. Indeed a major variable in assessing the trajectory of state and peace building in 
south Sudan is the whole issue of DDR. The broader aspect of DDR which includes 
political, security and socio-economic components (or the lack of it) would clearly point 
the direction any country is going to take. And it is not surprising to find out that both 
forced and voluntary disarmament in south Sudan has been a complete failure and it 
bore heavy consequences. This multi-million project24 was rigged with corruption and 
was exploited by the leadership as an opportunity to rid the army of its elderly, disabled 
and women. Furthermore, it was viewed as a great chance by the political elite to 
populate their extended kinship networks into government jobs. It is fair to assume that 
the crisis in south Sudan is the failure of demilitarization and state building. 
By the same token it can be argued that the current war of South Sudan is symptomatic 
of the failure of the internationally sponsored state-building project, among which 
demilitarization figures prominently.25 Initial disarmament among communities with 
which the SPLM/A had developed the closest relations during the armed struggle were 
generally positive. However, as far as the DDR process within the SPLA is concerned it is 
not an exaggeration to say that it targeted and rewarded the wrong people.26 In actual 
fact and contrary to DDR end sets the army was not “integrated” and resembled a 
collection of ethnic militias as evidenced by the level of fragmentation in the eruption of 
the recent conflict. The whole process has been poorly managed it failed to help state 
and peace building and in fact it afflicted the broader and long term agenda. This 
coupled with the rival narratives that helped proliferate rival militia groups’ remains to 
be a major roadblock against peaceful political order. Therefore, though the SPLA 
certainly grew in size thus protecting the future independent country from its northern 
foe, this growth also served the Southern elite’s strategy of self-consolidation (or self-
destruction) at the expense of state consolidation to the extent that one cannot clearly 
assert what is happening in south Sudan is state building or state destruction. The 
                                                          
24 South Sudan benefitted from one of the most expensive DDR packages in the world along Afghanistan’  
25 Clemence Pinaud,The War in South Sudan,Briefing Note 7.March 2015. Observatoire des Enjeux 
Politiques et Sécuritaires dans la Corne de l’Afrique. 
26 Many involved in the project openly admitted this process had been a disgraceful joke. 25, was by all 
accounts a sham. 
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whole transition has been further complicated by the nature of elite contest for power 
between the ‘Garang and Salva boys’. 
From Garang to Salva 
Whatever the circumstances of Garang’s death it was only a matter of time before Salva 
Kiir assumed the top leadership of the SPLM/A. The two had a history of tension and 
cooperation and less than a year ago Garang was believed to have flirted with the 
dismissal of his deputy from part and army positions which was averted in 2004 by 
what could otherwise be described as an odd congregation of the SPLM/A leadership in 
Rumbek.. Events took their own turn and Salva remained the sole legitimate 
replacement. Salva inherited the party and subsequent government leadership upon the 
death of John Garang on 31 July 2005, only seven months after the signing of the CPA.  
He had been the deputy leader under Garang, but had little power, was wholly 
unprepared to hold high office, and was largely unknown internationally.  Nonetheless, 
given his seniority he was accepted as chairman of the party to stop a descent into a 
debilitating power struggle with the ‘sons of Garang’ who had dominated the party and 
army from its inception.  Any internal conflicts could have wiped out the gains of the 
peace process and taken the country back to war.  
Just as Salva assumed the top position, Dr. Riek Macher became his deputy and from the 
outset he had ambitions to replace Salva, just as he had earlier aspired to replace 
Garang. Indeed, this competition was highlighted at the 2008 SPLM Convention when 
Riek had to be persuaded not to run against Salva for the presidency of the party. 27 
However, the most important internal challenge to Salava did not come from Riek and 
the Nuer but rather from the so-called ‘Garang boys’. The ramifications of this are yet to 
be seen. But its impact on the conflict in Sudan and south Sudan, regional and 
international relations and peaceful and well-governed state is clearly enormous. Some 
of the repercussions are political and ideological in nature among which the whole issue 
of south Sudan and New Sudan figures prominently. This might have affected the need 
for internal cohesion, focus and mobilisation of resources for peace and state building as 
well. Having just come to power, Salva was looking for allies outside the Garangists and 
many came to fit the bill. This brings us to the continued infiltration of the SPLM by the 
NCP.  
                                                          
27 SPLM?A Meeting documents 
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The NCP and Salva’s SPLM: Expediency or Hostile Takeover? 
A critical development in the nature of political power and power relations in Juba in 
recent years is the progressive influence of the National Congress Party/NCP/. The 
import of Khartoum friendly ministers into the Juba government to replace its most 
vociferous opponents has been welcomed by the NCP and has already had a number of 
impacts. Beyond the non-entities appointed to the new government were ministers with 
strong ties to Sudan and even to the NCP. Many of them served in top positions in south 
Sudan under Khartoum and in several positions of the NCP branch in Juba. Salava’s 
calculations are simple and belong to the realm of parochial political agendas. Arguably, 
south Sudanese who were formerly tied to the NCP could help him bolster his efforts to 
remove the Garangists who he concluded were out to displace him, and also he might be 
attracted by their political and administrative experience as well as their ethnic 
affiliations.  
And this process is emerging at the expense of the Dinka’s from Bor, the home area of 
John Garang, and the parallel consolidation of Dinka Bahr Ghazal. A number of the 
Garangists removed from the government who are perceived as being opposed to the 
president in the army are Bor Dinka, but politics and not ethnicity was the basis of 
Salva’s decision, and indeed he is anxious not to lose the support of the community to 
Riek.  Besides, the contagion effect of the NCP would affect the nature of the much 
needed political transformation and state building in south Sudan, and the region at 
large. Whatever the motive and the ethnic cards associated with it this particular 
development has the potential- it has already started, at least at the elite level- to turn 
the liberation mythology upside down.    
A Synopsis of Political Narratives: Why the Recent War was Inevitable? 
Based on the interviews conducted in all states of south Sudan and respondents’ 
rankings of the most important security threats in the country, one would wonder if not 
determine whether some narratives are more important in some sections of south 
Sudanese society than others.28 While corruption and lack of development (common to 
                                                          
28 Popular consultations on the development of the National Security Policy of the republic of South 
Sudan. Between March and May 2013 the Republic of South Sudan undertook state level consultations on 
the draft National Security Policy/NSP/. State level consultations have generated a lot of substantive 
ideas to the draft NSP document, triggered huge national interest on security issues and attracted 
attention of both the general public and political leaders at the Center. 
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all states and ethnic groups) is highly pronounced the issue of decentralization and 
federalism had come out strongly among the Equatorians as well as the Nuer and the 
Shiluk, in Upper Nile and Unity States. Decentralization and federalism are not a major 
concern for the states that has been part of the Greater Bahr Ghazal, largely inhabited by 
the Dinka partly due to the link between ethnicity, liberation struggle, demography and 
political power. 
The public opinion in Western Bahr Ghazal state where an amalgamation of small non-
Dinka tribes dominate is fully conversant with those of the Nuer and the Shiluk than the 
Dinka. Even though almost two thirds of the smaller tribes in the region raised the 
conflict with North Sudan as a source of concern their particular issue of 
disappointment is corruption and lack of service delivery, a scourge common to all 
communities. However, an examination of the results of our question asking 
respondents about the nature of the political system and the state, the good governance 
argument was unlikely to persuade them support the SPLM dominated government. 
The widely held view is that the fundamental contradiction in south Sudan is what they 
referred to as the ‘division between the oppressed’ (by which they meant the majority 
of the people of South Sudan particularly those who were not at the centre of the 
liberation struggle) and the so-called liberators i.e Dinka dominated SPLM. The political 
undertones of their responses seem to reflect the ethnography, closeness and 
remoteness to the respective involvement in the liberation struggle and the evolving 
power relations in the new state.  
The specific concerns raised by the smaller ethnic groups in WBS are not totally 
unlinked to the specific nature and ethnic composition of the state. Many abhorred the 
fact that the Danka’s expand to their lands and towns and displace them to control 
administrative structures. They expressed distrust and distaste to the force-backed 
grabbing of land and violent governance mechanisms. Similar views are expressed by 
the Equatorians except with stronger language and tone that is reminiscent of the 
Kokora movement of the 1970s. For Equatorians the border issue(internal 
borders),uncontrolled expansion of the Dinka’s aided by Cattle Generals and the 
oppressive security apparatus of the ‘Dinka-dominated’ institutions have become major 
areas of concern. The drift towards strong federalism espoused by Equatorians is now 
almost shared by most of the other ethnic groups in the country, including the Nuer who 
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tend to assume a comparable level of power with the Dinka. Interestingly, resistance to 
the kind of Federalism espoused by several groups in the country, had come out clearly 
in the areas inhabited by the Dinka. Addressing these issues is critical in the process of 
restructuring the state in south Sudan.  
Not surprisingly, the dissatisfaction about the SPLA is reinforced by the fact that the 
other communities from Yambio to Malakal believe the army doesn’t represent them 
and tribal domination of the army is a major source of grievance. As one puts it ‘the 
SPLA only defends the SPLM not the people’. The problem is that supporters of each 
narrative and political position in the present day south Sudan tended to think that their 
grievances are legitimate and their preferred political agendas are widely supported 
and electable in a democratic election. The issue of civilian disarmament and its blow 
back effect on security has also been mentioned repeatedly as a major source of 
grievance. 
As far as the nature and identity of the future south Sudanese state and the perceived 
Dinka-domination is concerned many of the other groups often began with doubt and 
ended in certainty. Particularly the Equatorians and the Nuer had plenty of tribulations 
to record, but in their narratives the tribulations never end, the doubts never cease. As 
perceived by them Dinka brutality, arrogance and expansion glued with the migration of 
cattle, tribalism and corruption, land grabbers and cattle raiders topped the list of 
security threats in south Sudan. As a result the camp of those who consider themselves 
‘looser with grievances’ has been fast expanding. Unable or unwilling to seek a collective 
memory and command a common narrative the SPLA encouraged tribalism and 
segmentation and continued to do after it assumed state power. The regime has only 
survived through international support and even then it has lurched from one crisis to 
the next.  But when the oil revenues which fed the patronage network dried up because 
of the government’s decision to cut off the transit of oil to Sudan it did not take long for 
the SPLM to implode. 
Concluding remarks 
The SPLM/A had a weak institutional base and poorly pronounced narratives..  Often it 
pursued political objectives at odds with the aspirations of south Sudanese which has 
defined the trajectory of peace and state building. The SPLA never had a political party 
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until very late in the day, New Sudan was more of a vision than an ideology and never 
captured the minds of southern Sudanese, its leadership proved incapable of 
overcoming local conflicts and developing national sentiments and the dominant ethos 
of the movement was militarism. As a result, the SPLA fostered, rather than dampened, 
tribal sentiments and was widely viewed – particularly in the Nuer lands and Equatoria 
– as an occupying force and not a liberation army. Typically revolutionary parties in 
Africa fostered national sentiments and attempted to limit tribal based patrimonialism 
by indoctrinating their supporters with a strong ideology.   But in the absence of a South 
Sudanese nationalism, patrimonial politics always dominated the SPLM/A and its scope 
simply expanded when the SPLM/A assumed a hegemonic position in the state.   
Perhaps a recurring theme in the peace processes in Sudan and now south Sudan is that 
the peace agreements remained elitist, exclusionary, governed by a simplistic view of 
bringing together personalities and failed to address the underlying causes of the war. 
Unfortunately the same goes by in the current peace process in south Sudan. In the 
present circumstances diplomatic efforts geared at reaching an agreement between 
President Salva Kiir and his former Vice-President Dr. Riek Macher follow the same 
pattern and will likely produce similar problematic results.  In the run up to the CPA 
John Garang and Osman Mohammed Taha were at least leaders of their respective 
organizations who had a high degree of control over their armed groups, which is not 
the case with Salva and Riek. Recent events make clear that Salva is only nominally in 
charge of a badly broken SPLA and is increasingly dependent internally on hard-line 
Dinka figures and the Jieng Council and until recently on Yoweri Museveni’s army, while 
Riek is leading a collection of SPLA fragments, militias, and white army groups over 
which he has limited control.   
Even if IGAD and the diplomats are successful in bringing Riek and Salva together, there 
is little hope that will produce sustained peace, much less address the underlying causes 
of the conflict.  Indeed, Salva’s post-25 July 2013 government is based on so-called 
technocrats and NCP friendly politicians and they were specifically selected because 
they are bitter enemies of the Garangists they replaced.  The diplomats’ efforts to 
reconcile these warring camps and even  to bring them into an expanded government is 
a recipe for deadlock, divisions, more inter-elite competition, and probably a return to 
war before too long.  Moreover, presumably this government will be led by Salva Kiir, 
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who – after the killing of Nuers in Juba in the period of 15-18 December – may be found 
to be a war criminal. 
Riek’s claim that he does not lead an ethnic revolt of the Nuers is based on his fragile 
alliance with Garangists that Salva first dismissed from his government and then jailed.  
Riek then made the release of the Garangists a pre-condition for negotiations and the 
diplomats devoted their energies to achieving that end.  But the people of South Sudan, 
including the Nuers, were happy to see the end of this motley crew and cannot be 
expected to believe that their return to power will bring peace, much less development, 
after they failed in the last 12 years to do anything but line their own pockets.  The 
demand for a government of national unity and elections, however, fits the mould of 
elite accommodation and the top-down peace efforts that characterized the failed Sudan 
peace process which will continue to be at odds with the broader peace and state 
building agendas in south Sudan. Unless the underlying causes are addressed and 
competing narratives are tackled in a serious and practical manner everything else will 
remain superficial. The way forward requires that competing and antagonistic 
narratives of statehood are bridged and the south Sudan political elite adopt a clear and 
coherent political project that reflects the history and political aspirations of the people 
of south Sudan. Hence, reframing narratives of statehood is more pivotal than ever. 
Reframing Narratives of State Building in Africa: Lessons from South Sudan 
 The early history and political development of the SPLM/A has greatly 
compromised the trajectory of peace and state building in south Sudan. Torn 
between confusing ideologies and contradictory political agendas the SPLM/A 
was ill prepared to push state and peace building forward. The SPLM/A chose to 
ignore, often suppress, the dominant popular narratives of statehood in South 
Sudan and ended up only holding power without an overarching peace and state 
building agenda. 
 A liberation movement or a political party aspiring to lead a country, if it is going 
to be taken seriously and gain legitimacy, has to seriously work on the competing 
narratives in advance and develop a coherent agenda of peace and state building. 
 The ideology of the SPLM/A thus says little about the people of the south, the 
conditions they live in, and their aspirations, apart from the popular demand for 
self-determination; instead it is largely a series of ideas suspended in space. 
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 Unless competing narratives and antagonistic political projects are bridged state 
and peace building, particularly in the context a country emerging from conflict 
becomes deeply flawed and problematic. 
 Ideologies that breed confusion and are readily manipulated cannot contribute 
to a strong narrative of statehood. Indeed, for the SPLM/A ideological clarity had 
little value and little thought has gone into developing it. 
 The case of the SPLM/A is suggestive of the contradiction between appearance 
and reality. As well as its internal problems, the SPLM/A suffers from multi-
faceted dependency i.e. economic, political and diplomatic. 
 As far as the SPLM/A is concerned sheer militarism without a strong political 
organ had serious consequences for the group and the young nation it was 
supposed to lead and transform. Particularly critical here is the contagion effect 
of the regimes in the region on the SPLM with the potential to discredit the 
liberation narrative and mythology for which millions of south Sudanese lost 
their lives. Of immediate concern is however its negative implication on peace 
and governance in south Sudan. 
 The attempt to impose liberal formulas of state building into a traditional and 
deeply illiberal society and social base is also deeply problematic. 
 The lack of attention given to political concerns; apart from popular slogans is a 
key determinant. SPLM leader have done little to politically educate their people. 
Negligence to reconcile competing narratives and the weakness to properly 
educate and mobilise the southern population around them had a huge cost in 
terms of opportunities lost in peace and state building endeavours. 
 Most of the responsibility lies in the inability of the SPLM/A to develop a 
coherent ideology that would lay the basis for unity and for joint action to 
transform society and build the state. 
 It is fair to assume that the crisis in south Sudan is the failure of demilitarization 
and state building. South Sudan is emblematic of the direct link between failed 
and mismanaged DDR and the challenges of peace and state building. The 
practical axis that there is always violent conflict when there is war before or 
war next door is highly relevant to the predicament of the south Sudanese. The 
centrality of successful DDR in all of this cannot be overstated. 
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 The international community is arguably largely responsible for allowing the 
elite to plunder the new state to sustain their businesses and their own military 
bases within and outside of the army. To a certain extent, the liberal peace-
making vision that concentrated on elite accommodation rather than the broader 
political realm and on the economic and political empowerment of ‘ordinary’ 
people during the CPA negotiations facilitated the rise and consolidation of 
ruling elite prone to the political economy of corruption and rent-seeking. 
 
 
 
